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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JESUS A. JIMENEZ, : Case No. 2Q080892-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
. 1 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (2008). Appellant Jesus A. Jimenez filed a notice of appeal from the trial 
court's judgment and conviction for criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony 
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1973 as amended) and aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1973 as amended) to the 
Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. The 
judgment is attached as Addendum A. (R. 131-132). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND 
GROUNDS FOR APPEAL 
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
A. Issue: Whether the defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss as 
1 
to the aggravated robbery charges at the end of the State's case, for a directed verdict at 
the close of all the evidence, or request a proper jury instruction and object to the 
dangerous weapon enhancement instructions given by the trial court, constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B. Standard of Review: The standard of review with respect to the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal presents a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Perry, 2009 UT. App. 51, 1 9; 
State v. Cox, 2007 UT. App. 317,1f 10, 169 P.3d 806. 
C. Grounds for Review: Defense counsel's failure to move for 
dismissal of the aggravated robbery charge is found at 149:8; failure to move for a 
directed verdict at 149:17, 18, 24, 25; and failure to object and acceptance of the courts 
proposed jury instructions is found at 149:25. The set of instructions given to the jury (R. 
109-124) is attached as Addendum B. The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was 
not raised in the trial court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Harper, 2006 UT App 178, If 7 , 136 P.3rd 1261. Review of a claim of due process 
violation for ineffective assistance of counsel presents an exception to the preservation 
rule. State v. Perry, 2009 UT. App. 51,19. 
II. Plain Error. 
Issue: Whether the trial court's failure to sua sponte dismiss the aggravated 
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robbery charge at the end of the State's case or to direct a verdict of dismissal at the close 
of all the evidence constituted plain error. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review with respect to the 
commission of plain error is that the trial court's ruling will be reversed only if (i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the defendant. Id; State v. Diaz-Aravalo, 200$ UT App 219, f 8 (June, 
2008). 
A. Grounds for Review: The factual underpinnings of this issue, i.e., 
failure to dismiss sua sponte the aggravated robbery charge may be found at 149:8 and 
149:17-25; the courts proposed jury instructions are referenced in the trial transcript at 
149:25, may be found at R. 109-124, and are included in Addendum B. The issue of plain 
error was not raised in the trial court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal as an 
exception to the preservation rule. State v. Perry, 2009 UT. App. 51, f 9; State v. Harper, 
2006 UT App 178, f 7, 136 P.3rd 1261. 
III. Manifest Injustice. 
A. Issue: Whether the trial court's failure to properly instruct the 
jury as to the elements off 76-3-203.8, Utah Code Ann. (2003), Increase of Sentence if 
Dangerous Weapon Used, requiring a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that "the 
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defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present," amounted to manifest injustice 
requiring reversal. 
B. Standard of Review: The manifest injustice standard is generally 
synonymous with the plain error standard. State v. Alinas, 2007 UT 83, \ 10, 131 P. 3 
1046. The standard of review with respect to the commission of plain error is that the 
trial court's ruling will be reversed only if (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. Id; State v. 
Diaz-Aravalo, 2008 UT App 219, % 8 (June, 2008) 
C. Grounds for Review: The trial court's jury instructions are 
referenced in the trial transcript at 149:25, may be found at R. 109-124, and Addendum B. 
The trial court's increased sentence on the aggravated robbery from five years to life to 
six years to life is found at R. 132. The issue of manifest injustice was not raised in the 
trial court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116, 
121-122; State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, f 7, 136 P.3 1261. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are relevant to the issues and set forth at Addendum C: 
1 . Criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony offense under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (2003). 
4 
2. Aggravated robbery, a first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-302 (2003). 
3. Robbery, a second degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 
(2004). 
4. Felony Conviction - indeterminate term of imprisonment under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203(2003). 
5. Increase of Sentence if Dangerous Weapon Used, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.8 
(2003), 
6. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for conduct of 
another, §76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated. 
The following rules are relevant to the issues and set forth at Addendum D: 
1 . Rule 19(e) Utah R. Crim. P. 
2. Rule 22(e) Utah R. Crim. P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASfi 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
In August 2007, the State charged Mr. Jimenez with Criminal Homicide, murder, a 
first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1973 as amended), and 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(2003). (R. 1-3) In December 2007, the trial court bound Jimenez over for trial on the 
charges. (R. 36-37) Jimenez was arraigned and trial was scheduled for June 2008. (R. 
5 
41-42) 
The trial began on June 24, 2008 (R. 76-79), and on June 25 the jury found him 
guilty as charged. (R. 78-79) On September 18, 2008, the trial court sentenced Jimenez 
as follows: for count one, Murder, it ordered him to serve an indeterminate prison term of 
fifteen years and which may be for life; and for count two, Aggravated Robbery, it 
ordered him to serve an indeterminate prison term of not less than six years and which 
may be for life, with both counts to run consecutively. (R. 131-132). On October 17, 
2008, Jimenez filed a notice of appeal. (R. 136-137). The notice is timely. See Utah R. 
App. P. 3 & 4 (2008). Jimenez is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE. 
At about 3:45 p.m. on August 15, 2007 Faviola Hernandez's ("Favi") was dropped 
her off by her mother at her beauty salon, The Shop, along with Laura Hernandez, 
Faviola's 12 year old little sister, and her six year old little brother, Junior Hernandez. (R. 
148:15, 32) She was coming from her other job. Her little brother was going to get a 
haircut. (R. 148:44) Lionel Hernandez, who had been getting his hair cut by Faviola for 
about a year, was waiting for her to get a haircut. (R. 148:20-21, 44) 
The Shop is located at 1331 West California, Salt Lake City (West Valley), Salt 
Lake County, at the intersection of California and Navajo. (R. 148: 116, 136) The 
children, Laura and Junior, stayed inside a little while and then went across the street to 
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the playground to play. The playground can be seen through the door of The Shop, and 
Faviola came out once or twice and yelled "La La," checking on them. (R. 148:34, 39, 
45). 
Laura testified that it seemed like they were a long time at the playground "but (it) 
probably wasn't." (148:46) After a while, the children went back to The Shop because it 
was too hot outside and sat in the chairs in a little waiting room and looked at magazines 
for about 10 minutes. (R. 148:42, 46) 
When Laura and her little brother were at the playground, Laura testified, she 
observed that a green car kept driving back and forth. (R. 148:35) She saw this car 
driving northbound on Navajo and slow down south of The Shop. She was chasing her 
little brother when she first saw it, but it caught her eye because it slowed down. (R. 
148:50) She thought it was probably one of Faviola's clients because it started to slow 
down like it was going to park, but kept going straight and turned westbound on 
California. (R. 148:36) When she saw it again it was coming eastbound on California, 
and went slow as it got closer to The Shop. Then, she testified, she saw it again 
westbound on California and it kept going straight. The car would slow down and then 
step on the gas. (R. 148:36, 37) She recognized the car because it was going slower, 
even slower than before. She thought to herself that it was probably lost. (R. 148:38) 
She didn't get a license plate or make of car, and thought it had 4 doors, but 
couldn't specifically recall. She thought the windows were tinted a little. She was unable 
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to identify the driver. She testified that she saw a guy driving the car "like a shadow 
because I was pretty far so I couldn't really make out." She said she saw a guy driving 
and some blonde hair. She testified that later she informed the police that she saw blonde 
hair from, "like, the back." (R. 148:49) 
Laura identified Exhibit 8 as a photograph of the green car she had seen next to the 
school (R. 148:39), Exhibits 9 and 10 as photographs of the green car on Navajo street (R. 
148:40), and Exhibit 12 as a photograph of the green car next to The Shop (R. 148:40). 
Brian Alders, an electronic technician employed with the Salt Lake City School 
District maintenance department testified. His primary involvement with the school 
district involved surveillance of all schools in the district. All of the schools in Salt Lake 
City School District are connected in this system of surveillance cameras, which is 
monitored through network remote software at the district maintenance office at 1005 
West Beardsley Place in Salt Lake City. (R. 148:124, 129) There are surveillance 
cameras at Mountain View Elementary and in Glendale Middle School, approximately 16 
per building. (R. 148:113) 
The personnel at the various schools are trained to review the video recordings 
made by the cameras, and they are used by staff. (R. 148:124-125) If a problem is 
observed with one of the cameras from the main office, however, either Ahlers or his 
partner, the only other individuals trained to maintain the system, must go to the particular 
school to make the repair. The cameras require constant maintenance, with such matters 
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as blown fuses, insects, rain, and a variety of problems associated with electronic devices 
out in the weather. (R. 148:123, 127) The cameras have a digital recording unit and a 
clock which was set when the system was installed. The time is reviewed twice a year for 
accuracy. (R. 148:117) 
Mr. Alhers testified that he is called upon by the police from time to time to review 
the material that is recorded by the cameras, which can be preserved on CD, and would 
otherwise after a period of time be overwritten by the system. (R. 148:125) 
He was contacted by the Salt Lake Police Department about 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. on 
August 15, 2007 to review the cameras, approximately 6, pointed in the direction of the 
beauty shop at California and Navajo. (R. 148:116) Mountain View Elementary school 
is closest to California and Navajo with 16 cameras scattered inside and outside. Just 
south is Glendale intermediate with 13 cameras. (R. 148:115) He was asked to review 
the tapes between 3:30 and 4:30 or 5:00 p.m. and obtained footage from four of the 
cameras. (R. 148:115) One of the cameras is a static camera pointing toward California. 
The other three are pan/tilt/zoom cameras, pre-programmed in a pattern covering most of 
the grounds and places of interest to be watched. (R. 148:118) It is not entirely clear 
from the record which of the schools' cameras captured the images which were made into 
exhibits for use during trial, however Mr. Ahlers identified Exhibits 8 through 15 as stills 
from the north side of Mountain View Elementary School. (R. 148:115) He testified, 
without objection as to foundation from defense counsel, that he had checked the times 
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recorded on the images taken for accuracy, and they were correct. (R. 148:118) At least 
one of the identified exhibit photographs indicated that it was taken at 4:31 p.m. on 
August 15, 2007. (R. 148:121) 
Cassandra Matern testified under a grant of use immunity. (R. 148:5-6) 
Cassandra is the erstwhile girlfriend of Mr. Jimenez. They were boyfriend and girlfriend, 
dating on August 15, 2007, and Jimenez is the father of their daughter born April 8, 2007. 
(R.148:56-7) She has another child two years old by a different father. (R.148:81) Both 
Jimenez and the father of her other child speak Spanish. Both fathers speak English, but 
they also speak Spanish and have Spanish speaking friends. (R. 148:82) She on the other 
hand, although she dates Spanish speaking people, speaks and understands very little 
Spanish herself, according to her testimony. (R. 148:65, 82) 
On August 15, 2009, Jimenez picked her up at about 3:00 p.m. or little after, 3:30 
p.m. Then they picked up her father a little after 3:00 p.m. He cashed his check and "we 
took him either to Trax or home." (R. 148:58) Cassandra's father, Llewellyn Craig 
Matem, testified that they, Jimenez and Cassandra, dropped "the babies" off at Trax at 
about 3:31 p.m. and his wife and he took Trax back to their home in Midvale with the 
children. (R. 148:104-5) Mr. Jimenez drove the green Honda vehicle, which he and 
Cassandra purchased together in his name, and that she paid for but that she did not often 
drive. (R. 148:61, 85, 105) Jimenez always drove the Honda and her father never saw 
him driving other cars. (R. 148:111) 
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After leaving the Trax station at 1300 South, Jimenez drove the Accord, which 
Cassandra testified was "(g)reen with rims and four doors" (R. 148:61) to pick up Miguel 
Mateos (a.k.a. "Toker"), whom she met through Jimenez and had know for about a 
month, in Rose Park around Redwood Road and 6th North. (R. 148:59-60) Mateos, 
wearing Levis and a white t-shirt, rode in the front, she in the back. (R. 148:60, 64) From 
there they drove around a little while and then drove around The Shop (which she 
testified was called The Bushwhacker) four or five times, during which time Jimenez and 
Mateos "talked a little bit but in Spanish." (R. 148:61, 64) On direct examination 
Cassandra was asked what they said, to which she responded, "that she was alone." 
Defense counsel's objection as to hearsay was sustained, however counsel made no 
motion to strike the evidence, which had already come in. (R. 148:65) 
Cassandra testified that "She had looked out, I think, maybe the third time we went 
past." Her testimony was that she saw a girl, didn't know who it was, didn't see her face, 
and didn't know what she was wearing, but observed that she had black hair. She saw her 
inside looking out of the door on the Navajo side. (R. 148:65) 
She testified that she got suspicious about the third time they went past The Shop 
because they continued going past it. At a point in time Jimenez stopped the car south of 
The Shop, Mateos disembarked "and me and Jesus flipped around. And then Jesus told 
me to get down to the back seat. He told me that I better get down." At this point they 
were going south on Navajo. "We had flipped the car around on Navajo. We were facing 
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south. Yes, south. And then Jesus told me to get down. He told me I better get down." 
(R. 148:65, 66) 
At about that point, she testified, they didn't say anything else. Then she heard a 
gunshot and told Jimenez to leave. He said, "no stop a second." I told him to leave and 
he said no. She did not believe anything else was said at that point. (R. 148:68) 
Leonel Hernandez testified that he saw, through the mirror at The Shop, a man 
come in. The man was short, chubby and bald, wearing a plain white shirt, but he 
couldn't recall his pants. Mr. Hernandez turned around and the man said, ff(g)ive me your 
money," pointed a gun at him and told him to get on the ground. As the man had a gun in 
his face, he complied and got down on the ground. He got a look at the gun, which he 
described as chrome-ish, light gray, but didn't know if it was a revolver, automatic or 
what kind. Faviola was there with her little brother and sister. The man kept asking for 
money. Faviola was behind him and he couldn't see what she was doing. (R. 148:22-24, 
29-30) 
The man kept asking for money, and asked Hernandez for his wallet. He reached 
for his wallet but the man told him to stay down on the floor. The man continued asking 
Faviola for money, so Hernandez told her to just give him money. As he was on the floor 
with a wallet in his hand, "that's when I heard a gunshot." At first he stayed still, then 
when he turned around and saw the door and the man was gone he started getting up. He 
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saw Faviola was standing by the door. "She let me know she had got shot." When she 
told him she got shot, "my main priority was just to lock the door." (R. 148:22-24) 
Hernandez locked the door. He had not seen her get shot, and only saw her after 
she had gotten shot and told him so. He remembered Faviola telling the man that her 
brother and sister were there and not to harm them. He reached for a phone and called 
911, then grabbed the towel he had around his neck and tried to stop her bleeding. He 
couldn't tell where she had been shot and did not at first see any blood. When she 
collapsed to the ground, he noticed blood coming from her chest and she was fading 
away. He told her to keep breathing, but she stopped breathing, gasped for air, and then 
blood started coming out of her mouth and nose every time she tried to breath. A police 
officer arrived first. Mr. Hernandez opened the door. The officer came in and ordered 
everyone outside. (R. 148:26-28) 
Laura Hernandez testified somewhat similarly. After she and her brother went 
back to the shop, they were sitting in chairs in a little waiting room looking at magazines. 
Then a man came in asking for money. He said "everybody on the floor," and repeated, 
"everyone on the floor." He took out his gun and everyone got on the floor. He pointed 
the gun at Laura and her little brother. Faviola said, "No. No, the kids. Don't hurt the 
kids." Then she ran in the back room and "(w)ent to go, I g^ess, to get her gun that she 
had for protection," and, "(w)hen she came back out I heard gunfire." She then identified 
Exhibit 2 as the picture of, "(t)he guy that killed my sister." (R. 148:42-43) 
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Laura described the gun used as silver cream bluish color with a leaf design like 
"on the old Western movies." She couldn't remember if it was big or small in his hand. 
She said when her sister went in the back, "I thought she was going to get her money but I 
guess she got her gun." (R. 148:48) 
She was not asked to describe the shooting. And she testified that she didn't see 
where the man in the white shirt went when he left. After he left, the door was shut, she 
saw nothing further, and she took her little brother to the room they had on the side. (R. 
148:52) 
According to the testimony of Cassandra Matem, when Miguel Mateos returned 
from The Shop, he ran out and got into the back seat behind the driver and they left and 
went to Wal-Mart at 13th South and Third West. They parked, Mateos got out of the car 
and he and Jimenez got in the front of the vehicle and took the stereo out. "We got there 
and they hid the gun behind the stereo. And I believe we went inside to Wal-Mart, me 
and Jesus." (R. 148:69) When Mateos went to the front of the vehicle, he still had the 
gun. Jesus took the stereo out of the dash put the gun behind and put the stereo back in. 
"Then me and Jesus went into the Wal-Mart." Mateos stayed outside in the car and put 
on a gray t-shirt. (R. 148:70) She couldn't specifically recall what occurred next, but 
they left Wal-Mart, and either dropped Miguel Mateos off and went to a taco stand or 
vice-versa. (R. 148:70) 
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On direct examination Cassandra was shown Exhibit 8 and testified that she saw a 
school and her green Honda going past The Shop. She als<^  recognized a white truck in 
the picture which she says was there on August 15, 2007. She identified Exhibit 13, 
recognizing the Honda and Mateos, "Toker," getting out, testifying that she recognized 
the white t-shirt. She was shown Exhibit 14, wherein she testified that she saw the Honda 
turn around, but no one else that she recognized. She was ^hown Exhibit 16, recognizing 
the Honda parked next to the school pointing south in the opposite direction from where 
they dropped "Toker" off. (R. 148:71-74) 
On cross-examination, she was shown State's Exhibit 11. She denied recognizing 
the car because of the dent in it or special striping and said $he recognized it because of 
the color. There is no other car that color that was there like that. She believed it was her 
car in the picture, however, because the pictures had the date imprinted on it. Had she not 
seen the date she would not know it was her car. (R. 148:91,92) 
Her description and at what point in time she observed the gun is unequivocal. It 
was only after the shooting and at the Wal-Mart that she observed the gun. The questions 
and answers, elicited on cross-examination, are as follows, 
Q: Did you get a look at this gun? 
A: Not really. I do believe it was silver. And I don't know what color the 
handle was, maybe brown. 
Q: Do you remember when you went to the DA's Office and it was recorded? 
Did you say it was black? 
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A: It was either black or brown, I wasn't sure. I know it was silver, like, not 
the handle but the other part was silver. But I'm not - it was a darker color, the handle. 
Q: How close did you get to this gun? 
A: They were in the front and I was in the back and that's it. 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Okay. Toker is pretty wide - -
A: Yes. 
Q: - - very fair to say. 
A: Yes. 
Q: He probably fits at least across his seat? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And were you leaning forward? 
A: No, I was just in the back. And I just saw when they put it in, like, into the 
hole, that's it. 
Q: Okay. This hole, is this a stereo that fits in the dashboard? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So it's one that you can take out at night so no one steals it? 
A: Yes. 
(R. 148:92-93). 
On cross-examination Cassandra admitted that she had previously told three 
different stories to the police, and that she had lied at the preliminary hearing which took 
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place on December 12, 2007. (R. 148:77-8) She testified that she knew she could be in 
trouble for that, but was not going to get in trouble because she made an arrangement 
with the prosecutor to tell the story she had related during trial and that it was agreed not 
to charge her with perjury, for her involvement in being at The Shop in August of 2007, 
and not to charge her with obstruction or anything involving this case. (R. 148:78) 
Gordon Parks, a homicide detective with the Salt L^ke Police Department, retired 
March 24, 2008, testified that he was the case manager investigating the incident at The 
Shop on August 15, 2007. He went to the scene, observed & very small beauty shop-
barbershop, 2 haircutting stations, two small separate rooms, attached to a larger place 
called Bushwhackers, which was entirely closed. Faviola Fernandez was still on the 
scene, lying in southernmost room, deceased. (R. 148:136-137) 
Although detective Parks spoke to Cassandra Matern briefly on August 16th when 
she was picked up, other detectives conducted the full interview. (R. 148:137) It was 
from their interview with Cassandra that they learned, indirectly, that she knew more 
about the incident than what she was telling them. Detective Parks was responsible for 
the media advisory, i.e., giving information to the news organizations. As such, as in 
other such cases, there was certain "hold-back information" which was purposely not 
given to the media. In this case, the media were specifically not given the information 
that the victim, Faviola, had a gun. The hold back information was given to other two 
detectives who took Cassandra's phone so she could not tip the defendant off. They 
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questioned her and when Cassandra first indicated that she heard about this murder on the 
news, divulging her knowledge that the victim had a gun, the police knew that she was at 
least lying about her source of information if not degree of involvement. (R.148:138-139, 
149) 
As a result of information received from Cassandra, the defendant was arrested 
driving a Honda vehicle on August 16, 2007. (R. 148:139, 140) The vehicle was 
impounded, and a search warrant obtained and executed. (R. 148:140) Detective Parks 
indicated, over defense counsel's objection, that fingerprints of Miguel Mateos were 
lifted from the vehicle. The objection was sustained, however, no motion to strike or 
admonish was made and the court gave no admonition to the jury. (R. 148:144) 
Detective Parks indicated that the gun was never recovered. (R. 148:145) At the time of 
trial, Miguel Mateos had not been apprehended. (R. 148:153) 
The State rested its case at this point. 
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel made a pro forma motion to 
dismiss for failure to establish di prima facie case connecting the two crimes committed by 
Miguel Mateos to Mr. Jimenez. In this case, all the State established, counsel briefly 
noted, is a killer identified as Miguel Mateos "going in with a gun to do the robbery and 
in the course of that robbery ended up killing someone." (R. 149:7-8). After this brief 
statement was made, the following exchange took place between court and counsel: 
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The Court: Do you believe that they have to show prior knowledge that he 
had a gun on him? 
Ms. Clark: No, just that he was going in~ 
The Court: To commit a robbery? 
Ms. Clark: Commit the robbery, yes. 
The Court: And you don't think that the testimony from Cassandra that they 
drove around slowed down, did a Uey, and he told her to get down, that a 
jury can't draw a reasonable inference from that, Ms. Clark, that he 
understood what was happening? 
Ms. Clark: If the court wants to rule that way. 
The Court: I appreciate you making the motion. The motion is going to be 
denied, clearly denied. 
(R. 149:8). 
Without further adieu, or an opening statement, defense counsel then commenced 
the case for the defense by recalling Detective Parks to the witness stand: 
Ms. Clark: My turn? 
The Court: Yes, your turn. 
Ms. Clark: Thank you, your honor. I would like to recall Detective Parks. 
(R. 149:10) 
The ensuing examination of detective Parks may safely be characterized as 
immaterial to this appeal, adding nothing of significance to the factual understanding of 
the murder-robbery of Faviola Hernandez. (R. 149:10-16). 
C. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 
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The record does not reflect that the defendant offered any proposed jury 
instructions. The State submitted proposed jury instructions. (R. 80-100). The 
instructions given by the court (R. 109-124) at the close of all the evidence were approved 
by counsel for both parties. Counsel for the State acknowledged that no instructions she 
requested were not given, and that she was "satisfied with the instructions." (R. 149:24-
25). The court pointedly queried, "(w)ill counsel for the defendant acknowledge that 
there are no instructions that counsel have requested that I have not given.'5 To which 
counsel replied, "(y)es> I will acknowledge that." 
(R. 149:25). The instructions, of course, contain a detailed aggravated robbery instruction 
(R. 91) but, as one was not requested, no lesser included offense of simple robbery was 
among the jury instructions. 
Jury Instructions No. 41 and 42 (R. 122-123), included in Addendum E, are of 
particular importance relative to the "dangerous weapon enhancement" feature of the 
subsequent sentencing. 
D. MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Defense counsel made no motion for a directed verdict. (R. 149:17-25) 
E. JURY VERDICT. 
The jury found the defendant guilty as to the charge of criminal homicide, murder, 
R. 125, aggravated robbery, R. 126, and that a dangerous weapon was used in the 
commission of the aggravated robbery, R. 126. The verdict forms are included in 
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Addendum F. 
F. SENTENCE. 
On September 18, 2008, the trial court sentenced Jirhenez as follows: for count 
one, Murder, it ordered him to serve an indeterminate prison term of fifteen years and 
which may be for life; and for count two, Aggravated Robbery, it ordered him to serve an 
indeterminate prison term of not less than six years and which may be for life, with both 
counts to run consecutively. (R. 131-132). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A. By failing at the close of the State's case to mov0 to dismiss Count II of the 
Information, the aggravated robbery charge, to move for a directed verdict at the close of 
all the evidence (or request a lesser included offense of robbery instruction), and in failing 
to object to the trial court's dangerous weapon instruction ot request a proper instruction, 
counsel's performance was professionally deficient and ineffective, which deficiency 
prejudiced the defense and affected the substantial rights of|the defendant, requiring 
reversal. 
B. The trial court erred in failing to sua sponte dismiss Count II of the Information 
for insufficient evidence and failure of the State to establish & prima facie case of 
aggravated robbery at the close of the State's case. The court also failed to direct a 
verdict of not guilty as to the aggravated robbery at the clos$ of all the evidence. This 
constituted plain error requiring reversal. 
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C. The trial court erred in failing to correctly instruct the jury with respect to the 
elements necessary for the jury to find with respect to the "dangerous weapon 
enhancement" in order to lawfully sentence the defendant to an increased minimum 
sentence (an increase of from five years to life, to six years to life). This error in 
instructing the jury rose to the level of manifest injustice requiring reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE TO DISMISS, MOVE FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT AS TO THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
CHARGE, OR REQUEST A PROPER INSTRUCTION REQUIRING 
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF 
THE DANGEROUS WEAPON ENHANCEMENT, DEPRIVED THE 
DEFENDANT OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 
A. STANDARD RESPECTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The question of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A defendant is required to 
establish (1) "that counsel's performance was deficient/' and (2) "that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense." State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ^  16, (Utah, February 
2008) quoting Strickland at 687. As to the first prong of Strickland, 
The seriousness of those errors is measured by whether 
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness." Specifically, "[a] convicted defendant... 
must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged 
not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. 
(Footnotes omitted) 
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State v. Eyre, at f^ 16, quoting Strickland at 687, 688. 
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT. 
1. Standard For Motion To Dismiss/Directed Verdict. 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss or for a directed verdict is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness giving no particular deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, 167 P. % 15; State v. Krueger, 1999 Ut. 
App. 54,1f 10, 975 P.2d 489. ""A defendant's motion to di$miss for insufficient evidence 
at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires the tri|d court to determine whether 
the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his defense.'" State v. 
Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, ^ 15,122 P.3d 895 quoting Skate v.Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 
1f 40, 70 P.3d 111 (citations omitted). 
When a party moves for a directed verdict on a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, "we will uphold the trial court's decision if, upon|reviewing the evidence and 
all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence 
exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, % 15, 167 P.3d 
503 quoting State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P. 
2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)) (alteration in original). 
It is not, however, within the trial court's province to assess the weight to be given 
the evidence. 
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When evaluating a motion for a directed verdict ""the court is 
not free to weigh the evidence and thus invade the province of the jury, 
whose prerogative it is to judge the facts.'" Mahmood, 1999 UT 104 at 
*[f 18 (quoting Mgmt. Comm. Of Grays tone Pines Homeowners Ass 'n v. 
Gray stone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1982)). Rather, the 
court's role is to determine whether the state has produced "believable 
evidence" on each element of the crime from which a jury, acting 
reasonably, could convict the defendant. 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^ 32, 84 P.3d 1183. On the other hand, circumstantial 
evidence alone may be sufficient to sustain the trial court's determination to give the case 
to the jury. Id., *l 33. 
Inferences, however, which are remote or speculative constitute an impermissible 
basis upon which to submit a case to the jury. State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 
App. 1998) quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,344 (Utah 1997). The "fabric of 
evidence against the defendant must cover the gap between the presumption of innocence 
and the proof of guilt." Id. quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444-445 (Utah 1983). 
2. Lack of Factual Basis to Submit Aggravated Robbery to Jury. 
Drawing all inferences in a light favorable to the verdict, the facts in this case 
simply do not give rise to an reasonable inference that Jimenez was an active participant 
with respect to the use of a gun by Miguel Mateos. In fact there is no evidence - nothing 
- which would tend to indicate, or from which an inference could be drawn that this 
defendant, Jesus Jimenez, was even aware that Miguel Mateos was carrying a gun 
between the time period he was picked up in Rose Park and his returning after the 
incident at The Shop to get back into the vehicle. 
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Certainly there is evidence from the testimony of Cassandra Matern that both she 
and Jimenez were aware of the gun after Mateos returned from The Shop. The first and 
only time which she indicates she saw the gun was when she was at the Wal-Mart in the 
back seat and Mateos and Jimenez were in the front seat pitting the gun in the stereo hole 
in the dashboard. (R. 148:92-93) Nothing about her testimony would tend to indicate, 
however, that prior to that time either she or Jimenez had any awareness of the presence 
of a gun. The evidence most favorable to such a position i^  the highly speculative 
possibility that since Mateos had on only a t-shirt, it might have been difficult to conceal a 
gun. Given that he was apparently quite heavyset (R. 148:30, 93), even that speculation is 
unfounded, and there is no testimony to that effect from Ca$sanda. In fact, every 
reasonable inference to be drawn from reading Cassandra Matern's testimony points 
toward the impression that she was surprised when she heard a shot coming from The 
Shop. The testimony of Cassandra that Jimenez did not waiiit to leave, at her urging, at 
that point, (R. 148:68) is wholly inconclusive and much too speculative to support an 
inference that he had prior knowledge that Mateos had a gun. Everything known about 
the gun from the transcript comes from inside The Shop frotn the inhabitants, or from 
Cassandra in her description of the gun when she observed it later at Wal-Mart as Mateos 
and Jimenez were putting it in the console of the vehicle. (R. 148:92-93). 
Beyond rank speculation, there is no factual basis for an inference that either 
Cassandra Matern or Jesus Jimenez knew that Mateos possessed or intended to use a gun 
25 
when he disembarked from the vehicle to go into The Shop. A sort of post hoc ergo 
propter hoc reasoning must be indulged to infer that either knew that there was a gun 
prior to Cassandra hearing the gunshot and the return of Mateos from The Shop. This is 
insufficient evidence from which one could sensibly say that the "fabric of evidence 
against the defendant... cover(s) the gap between the presumption of innocence and the 
proof of guilt." State v. Lyman, supra, at 281. 
3. Aggravated Robbery/Robbery. 
Utah Code section 76-6-301 defines aggravated robbery as the "intentional tak[ing 
of] personal property in the possession of another . . . by means of force" where in the 
course of committing the robbery, the defendant "uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Id. §§ 76-6-30l(l)(a), -302(1 )(a) (emphasis 
added). Further, Utah code section 76-l-601(5)(a) defines a "dangerous weapon" as "any 
item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." 
While the Information under which Jimenez was charged refers to Jimenez as a 
principal actor, the State pegged criminal liability, as it must, on a theory of complicity, 
i.e., that Jimenez drove the getaway car to and from the robbery. He never actually used a 
weapon or interacted with the victim.1 To establish criminality under a theory of 
accomplice liability, the State is required to prove that Jimenez "acted with both the intent 
1
 Under Utah law, accessory liability is not charged as a separate offense. Rather, it is a 
theory under which liability results. See State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, If 16 (stating that 
"the nature of accomplice liability makes it impossible for the State to charge an 
individual with accomplice liability standing alone"). 
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that the underlying offense be committed and the intent to kid the principal actor in the 
offense." State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, \ 13. In other words, "an 'accomplice' is one who 
participates in a crime in such a way that he could be charged and tried for the same 
offense." State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977). "Every person acting with 
the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2003). 
Consequently, under the plain language of the aggravated robbery statute, the 
prosecution's burden to present evidence on each element of the charged crime, and 
Utah's accessory liability law, the State could establish a prima facie case that Jimenez 
committed aggravated robbery only by presenting evidence to support a reasonable belief 
that Jimenez intentionally aided or encouraged Mateos with (1) the intentional taking; (2) 
of property; (3) from another; (4) by means of force; (5) while using or threatening to use 
a dangerous weapon. See Id. §§ 76-6-30 l(l)(a), 302(1 )(a) (2003). In light of this 
requirement, counsel erred in failing to move to dismiss the State's case for aggravated 
robbery because the State failed to present any evidence indicating that Jimenez intended, 
or even knew, that a dangerous weapon was going to be used during the commission of 
the underlying robbery. 
Utah's statutory scheme and case law make a distinction between simple and 
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aggravated robbery. In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme 
Court explicitly stated that courts ffmust observe th[e] critical distinction between robbery 
and aggravated robbery." Id. at 965. 
Every robbery does not involve a weapon. Defense counsel completely failed to 
argue that the State had not established & prima facie case because it had not presented 
any evidence indicating that Jimenez intended or even knew that a weapon was going to 
be used in the underlying crime. When the trial court asked defense counsel about this 
lack of evidence., counsel in effect shrugged and impliedly indicated that the court could 
infer that Jimenez knew about the weapon, under the apparent belief that all robberies 
involve weapons. (R. 149:8) This is a particularly egregious omission given the plain 
language, as discussed in Point III infra, of ^{76-3-203.8, Increase of Sentence if 
Dangerous Weapon Used, Utah Code Ann. (2003), in which the legislature saw fit to 
explicitly require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that a 
dangerous weapon was being used in the commission of a crime. 
Allowing Jimenez' conviction to stand would undermine Utah's statutory scheme 
f,and erode the statutory distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." Suniville, 
1A\ P.2d at 965. Utah law clearly requires more. The State must present some evidence 
indicating that Jimenez intended to aid Mateos with a robbery involving a dangerous 
weapon. See, e.g., In re M.B., 2008 UT App 433, ffl[13, 17 (discussing Utah's "presence 
plus other factors" requirement to support an inference of participation); In re V.T., 2008 
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UT App 189, 5 P.3d 1234 ("Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one 
an accomplice to a crime absent evidence showing—beyond a reasonable doubt—that 
defendant advise[d], instigate[d], encourage[d], or assist[e4] in perpetration of the crime." 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted))^ State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 
120, 123-24 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (reversing defendant's conviction for attempted 
criminal homicide under an accomplice liability theory because even though defendant 
was present "during the shooting's planning and commission11 he did not" advise, 
instigate, encourage, or assists in perpetration of the [shooting]."); See also State v. Smith, 
706 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Utah 1985) (imposing accomplice liability for aggravated 
robbery where defendant took an active role in planning and carrying out the aggravated 
robbery); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 84-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same). 
In further support of the position that the State is required to present some 
evidence indicating that Jimenez intended the use of a weapon during the underlying 
crime, compare Utah's aggravated robbery statute with its aggravated burglary statue. 
The aggravated robbery statute at issue in this case narrowly prohibits the actor's 
intentional use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-
301, 302 (2003) ("A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon."). In contrast, Utah's 
aggravated burglary statute imposes liability where any participant uses a weapon in the 
underlying burglary. More precisely, the aggravated burglary statute states that "[a] 
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person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a 
burglary the actor or another participant in the crime . . . uses or threatens the immediate 
use of any . . . dangerous weapon." Id. § 76-6-203(1 )(c) (2003). The difference between 
these two statutes is illuminating. 
Based on the language of the aggravated burglary statute, an accessory to burglary 
will face liability for aggravated burglary where any participant in the underlying burglary 
uses or threatens to use a weapon. The statute obviates the mens rea requirement 
otherwise imposed by accomplice liability law. 
The aggravated robbery statute, however, is not so broad. Absent similar language 
widely extending liability, the aggravated robbery statute only extends liability to co-
defendants within the confines of accessory liability law. In other words, to be liable for 
aggravated robbery, an accessory must have "solicited], requested], command[ed], 
encourage[ed], or intentionally aid[ed]" his co-defendants with the intentional use or 
threatened use of a dangerous weapon during the underlying robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-202 (2003). Had the legislature intended otherwise, it would have included the 
same language in both the aggravated burglary and the aggravated robbery statute. See 
State v. Richardson, 2006 UT App 238, \ 13, 139 P.3d 278 ("When interpreting the plain 
language of a particular statute, 'courts presume that the legislature used each word 
advisedly . . . .,ff (quoting State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, \ 7, 73 P.3d 978)). 
Where federal enhancement statutes criminalize the "use" of a dangerous weapon, 
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federal courts require the same type of evidence. For example, analyzing a federal 
statute imposing criminal liability on an accessory where, as here, a dangerous weapon 
was used during the commission of a violent crime, the Fifth Circuit explains that the 
prosecution must do more than establish that the defendant intended to aid in the 
underlying crime. See United States v. Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d 750, 757-58 (5th Cir. 
2005). Rather, the prosecution must show that the defendant intentionally aided or 
encouraged the use of the dangerous weapon. See Id. More specifically, the Fifth 
Circuit states that where the statute at issue criminalizes an accomplice for the "use" of a 
firearm, "the prosecution must prove that the defendant fact(ed] with the knowledge or 
specific intent of advancing the 'use1 of the firearm.1" Id. at 758 (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1998)). The prosecution 
must establish that the defendant intended to facilitate in the aggravating aspect of the 
crime: 
[Tjhere must be evidence that the defendant took some action to facilitate 
or encourage the use or carrying a firearm. The link to the firearm is 
necessary because the defendant is punished as a principal for 'using1 a 
firearm . . . and therefore must facilitate in the 'use' of the firearm rather 
than simply assist in the crime underlying the [enhancement] violation/" 
Id. (omission in original) (quoting Sorrells, 145 F.3d at 754). 
This evidentiary requirement, which federal courts refbr to as the "active 
participation requirement," may be satisfied where an accessary took part in planning the 
overall scheme or design for the crime or knew that guns weUe going to be used "and that 
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he took an affirmative act to encourage the use of the gun." United States v. Thompson, 
454 F.3d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). However, the active participation 
requirement is not satisfied where, as here, the defendant was merely a driver who 
participated tangentially in the underlying crime. See Id. (reversing the defendant's 
conviction for "aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during a crime of 
violence in contravention of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)" where the evidence failed to 
indicate that the defendant knew or encouraged the use of a weapon.). 
The active participation requirement derives from the United States Supreme Court 
cast, Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137(1995). See generally Id. (interpreting 18 
U.S.C.A. § 924 (c)(1) (amended)), superseded by statute. Criminal Use of Guns, Pub. L. 
No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469). In that case, the Supreme Court analyzed the reach of a 
federal statute that narrowly criminalized the "use" of a weapon during the commission of 
a violent crime. See Id. at 150. Persuaded by the plain meaning of the word "use," the 
Court held that where a statute criminalizes the use of a dangerous weapon, there must be 
evidence that the defendant "actively] employ [ed]" the weapon during the commission of 
the underlying crime. Id. In response to Bailey, Congress amended the statute the Court 
was interpreting so as to reach a broader array of conduct. See United States v. Pleasant, 
125 F.Supp.2d 173, 180-81 (E.D. Va. 2005) (describing Congress's reaction to Bailey). 
In its current form, the federal weapons enhancement statute broadly criminalizes using or 
carrying a gun "during and in relation to" a violent crime or possessing a gun "in 
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furtherance of1 a violent crime. See Id. at 180. In contrast], Utah's aggravated robbery 
statute is crafted much more narrowly. As previously explained, Utah's aggravated 
robbery statute criminalizes only the actual use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1 )(a) (2003). 
Consequently, to impose liability for aggravated robbery on a principal, the 
prosecution must show that the defendant actively employe^ a weapon during the 
commission of the underlying crime. To impose liability fqr aggravated robbery on Mr. 
Jimenez, as an accessory, however, the prosecution must demonstrate that the accessory 
intended the use or threatened use of the dangerous weapon. See State v. Briggs, 2008 
UT 75, TJ13 (stating that an accomplice is one who "acted with both the intent that the 
underlying offense be committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in the offense."); 
In re M.B„ 2008 UT APP 433, f 10 (stating that Utah accomplice liability law requires 
evidence of the accomplice's "active participation or involvement in the underlying 
crime"). As this rule relates to this case, the prosecution ha$ not met its burden because it 
has not established an affirmative connection between Jimenez and the weapon. The 
prosecution has not established probable cause for aggravated robbery because Jimenez 
was a passive participant in the underlying robbery. Consequently, counsel's error in 
failing to move to dismiss was highly prejudicial. 
Illuminating a result similar to the one required here, ^he Fifth Circuit bifurcated 
criminal liability between co-defendants where there was insufficient evidence to indicate 
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that one co-defendant "knew or intended that a gun would be used in the . . . robbery and 
that he took an affirmative act to facilitate or encourage the use of a gun." United States 
v. Thompson, 454 F.3d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). In that case, two co-
defendants had committed two robberies together, one in July and one in September. See 
Id. at 462. Regarding the July robbery, there was evidence that defendant Carter had 
participated in the crime by keeping watch over a nearby police station and acting as a 
getaway driver. See Id. In the September robbery, there was evidence that Carter actually 
purchased a gun from his brother and then provided it to his co-defendant to use in the 
robbery. See Id. Carter was convicted of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a 
violent crime for both robberies; however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction 
relating to the July robbery. See Id. at 462,467. The court was particularly persuaded by 
the fact that there was only "limited circumstantial evidence" attributing a connection 
between Carter and the gun and "the perpetrators believed when planning the July robbery 
that only one bank employee would have to be subdued in the course of the crime, which 
by itself would not necessarily require the use of a gun." Id. at 466. This is clearly 
applicable to the case at bar. 
At the close of the State's evidence, counsel in the instant matter made an 
indifferent motion to dismiss that the State had failed to establish Jimenez knowledge of 
Miguel Mateos's intent to actually commit a robbery, and tossed away, with no apparent 
thought, the requirement, articulated supra, that the State must prove that Mr. Jimenez 
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possessed, at the very least, an awareness, which the evidence fails to support, that 
Miguel Mateos had a gun when he disembarked from the Vehicle and entered The Shop. 
(R. 149:8-9) 
Defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss, for ^ directed verdict, or, at 
the very least, request a lesser included offense instruction regarding robbery, was 
deficient, i.e., "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment The 
seriousness of those errors is measured by whether "counsels' representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness." State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ^ | 16, 
179 P.3 792, quoting Strickland, supra, 456 U.S. 668, 687. Counsel's errors fell 
below any such objective standard of reasonableness in this instance. 
Counsel's failure cannot be mistaken for "trial strategy." While it is true that 
appellate courts "give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical 
decisions and will not question such decisions unless there i$ no reasonable basis 
supporting them." State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 293 (Utah Ct.App. 1998), here there 
was no such reasonable basis for counsels failure to move toi dismiss the aggravated 
robbery. There could only have been a benefit to making a njiotion to dismiss or for a 
directed verdict. Had the trial court refused to dismiss outright, but instead reduced the 
aggravated robbery to simple robbery, a not unlikely scenariq, the defendant would have 
only been better off, notwithstanding that murder, under f 76^5-203 can be sustained 
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utilizing either 1J76-5-203(l)(s) "Robbery under Section 76-6-301;' or ^j76-5-203(l)(t) 
"Aggravated Robbery under Section 76-6-302." The failure to move to dismiss or for a 
directed verdict served no useful strategy whatsoever. This court has observed, 
Tf 33 Trial counsel's failure to argue this lack of evidence after 
the State rested does not appear to have served a tactical purpose at 
trial; nor has the State offered a possible tactical purpose on appeal. 
"When no possible explanation or tactical reason exists for such a 
decision, we have held that the first part of the [ineffective assistance 
of counsel] test is satisfied." Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^  24 
(citation omitted). We conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise 
this lack of evidence as a basis for dismissal of the charge is "so 
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
Wickham, 2002 UT 72 at Tf 19. 
% 34 Moreover, we conclude that "but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different." Id (quotation and citation omitted). 
Had trial counsel raised this lack of evidence, there is a reasonable 
probability that the trial court would have dismissed the concealed weapon 
charge. Cf. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, at % 8. 
\ 35 The State argues that even had Smith's counsel moved for a 
directed verdict based on a lack of evidence, the State could have 
"properly and with little difficulty . . . moved to reopen and supply the 
missing evidence." State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600, 
601(1951). We are unconvinced. A trial court has discretionary 
authority to determine whether to reopen a case to admit additional 
evidence. See State v. Duncan, 102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (1942). 
Here, where the State obviously failed to introduce a necessary element of 
the crime, we are not convinced that the trial court would have necessarily 
allowed the State to reopen its case and supply the missing evidence. 
Accordingly, because of trial counsel's ineffective assistance related to this 
single charge, we reverse Smith's conviction for second-degree concealment 
of a dangerous weapon and remand for a new trial on that count. (Footnote 
omitted) 
State v. Smith, 2003 Ut App 52, ffif 33-35, 65 P.3d 648, 656. 
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C. COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE PREJUDICED 
THE DEFENSE. 
"In addition to demonstrating his counsel's deficiencies, the Strickland standard 
requires that a defendant also show that those deficiencies effected the outcome of the 
proceeding." Id. [^17, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-692. This is clearly 
demonstrable. 
While there may have been evidence indicating th$t Jimenez intended to aid in 
the underlying robbery, there was no evidence indicating hq intended the use of a weapon 
or even that he knew a weapon was present. Once at The Shop, Jimenez did not go inside 
or interact with the victim in any way. He only waited in thp car while Mateos went 
inside. There is no evidence that Jimenez had prior knowledge or participated in a plan, if 
Mateos actually planned to use the gun. Other than a circuntistantial connection indicating 
knowledge of the gun after the occurrence of the robbery, tl^ ere is no evidence whatsoever 
that Jimenez had an affirmative connection to its actual use in the underlying crime. 
Where there is no evidence linking Jimenez to the weapon, or even that he knew of its 
existence, his conviction for aggravated robbery must be reversed. Counsel erred in 
failing to advance the issue, even when pressed by the court, and the error was highly 
prejudicial. 
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Given defense counsel's failure to move to strike evidence which was heard by 
the jury over her sustained objections2, her failure to make an opening statement of any 
kind3, and, not to be too uncharitable, her somewhat unfocused cross-examinations, 
together with the fact that she completely waived the critical issues respecting knowledge 
of the defendant as to Mateos' possession and use of the gun, one might draw the 
conclusion that the ineffectiveness of the assistance of counsel could be presumed to be 
prejudicial on the basis that counsel "entirely fail(ed) to subject the prosecution's case to 
meaningful adversarial testing." State v. Perry, supra, 2009 UT App 51, f 15, quoting 
Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, [^32 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 
(1984). 
In any event, had defense counsel moved for dismissal or for a directed verdict, 
or requested a lesser included robbery offense instruction, there is every reason to believe 
that the result would have been different and favorable to Mr. Jimenez. State v. 
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ^ |30, 63 P.3d 110. Had the court dismissed the aggravated 
robbery charge outright, there would have been no basis upon which to convict Mr. 
Jimenez of Murder under Section 76-5-203, U.C.A., as charged in the information (R. 1-
3) or as defined injury instruction No. 35 (setting forth the elements of criminal 
2
 Asked what "they said" and Cassandra testified, "that she was alone." (R. 148:65). 
Detective Parks testified that there was a fingerprint of Miguel Mateos taken from the 
impounded vehicle. (R. 148:144-5) 
3
 Although counsel stated fTm waving and reserving my opening and reserving it for after 
the state's case," (R. 148:19) she failed to make even an overture toward making an 
opening statement at the close of the State's case. (R. 149:9-10) 
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homicide, murder, R. 116), i.e., homicide during the course of a robbery). Needless to 
say, this would have been a superior outcome. 
Had counsel not performed in such a deficient manner in failing to make the 
necessary motions to dismiss and/or for a directed verdict, there is a high probability that 
the result would have been different. Thus, reversal of the convictions of aggravated 
robbery and homicide murder, which was based upon a predicate offense of robbery, is 
required. 
Failing to request a jury instruction incorporating a lesser standard of culpability 
than required for aggravated robbery, while such an omission (unlike counsel's failures to 
make the appropriate motions) might be argued to be a tactical decision, was likely in this 
case merely a lapse on the part of counsel. Which deficiency prejudiced the defendant. 
The failure to request proper and appropriate instructions as to the dangerous 
weapon enhancement verdict, and resulting sentence enhancement, was also a result of 
deficient performance, probably a failure to read the enhancement statute, ^[76-3-203.8 
Utah Code Ann. See jury instructions No. 41 and 42, to whi^h defense counsel failed to 
object. This objective deficiency also amounted to harmful error as will be discussed in 
more detail in Point III, infra. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SUA SFONTE DISMISS 
THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AMOUNTED 
TO PLAIN ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
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A. THE PLAIN ERROR STANDARD. 
Under the plain error doctrine, reversal is required if (i) an error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. 
State v. Cox, 2007 Ut. App. 317, f 10, 169 P.3 806. 
B. THERE WAS ERROR. 
For the reasons set forth in Point LB, supra, which are incorporated herein, there 
was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilt as to the offense of aggravated 
robbery. The court, of course, has the power to dismiss any count of the Information for 
lack of evidence. See Rule 17 (p) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently 
submission of the State's case to the jury on such a theory was erroneous. 
C. THE ERROR WAS OBVIOUS. 
There is some indication that the trial court was at least subliminally aware of the 
error as it was occurring, viz., the trial court's question to counsel during her motion to 
dismiss, "Do you believe that they have to show prior knowledge that he had a gun on 
him?" (R. 149:8) While there may be no Utah case directly on all fours, the law is clear 
and well settled as to the distinction between aggravated robbery and robbery, and the 
facts of this case do not support the former. Thus, the error was obvious. 
D. THE ERROR WAS HARMFUL. 
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An error is considered harmless when it is "'sufficiently inconsequential that we 
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). Far from being 
inconsequential, there is an evident reasonable likelihood that the error in this case 
affected the outcome in the trial court. The error was extremely prejudicial to the 
defendant, so that a reversal is required. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AND SUBMIT AN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY 
REQUIRING PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT KNEW THAT A DANGEROUS WEAPON WAS PRESENT, 
AMOUNTED TO MANIFEST INJUSTICE REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
A. THE MANIFEST INJUSTICE STANDARD. 
In claiming error by the lower court in instructing the jury sufficient to require 
reversal, the defendant would seek to rely upon the plain error doctrine. Under the plain 
error doctrine, reversal is required if (i) an error exists; (ii) #ie error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. State v. Cox, 2007 
Ut App. 317, U 10, 169 P J 806 
However, the plain error doctrine has been repeatedly held to be unavailable 
where defense counsel fails to object to the instructions given. Id. \19, citing State v 
Hamilton, 2003 UT22, ] 54, 70 P. 3 111; and State v. Pindar, 2005 UT 15, ^ 61, 114 P.3 
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551. Nevertheless, Rule 19(e) Utah R. Crim. P. provides a remedy where manifest 
injustice has occurred: 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions 
are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they 
are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The 
court shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of 
the jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an 
instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a 
manifest injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify the matter 
to which the objection is made and the ground of the objection. (Emphasis 
added). 
The distinction between the plain error standard and the manifest injustice 
standard is of course largely semantic. The manifest injustice standard has been held to 
be synonymous with the plain error standard. State v. Alinas, 2007 UT 83, \ 10, 171 P.3 
1046. Consequently, the manifest injustice standard is the aforementioned formulation, 
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful. 
B. THERE WAS ERROR. 
Jury Instructions No. 41 and 42 (R. 122-123), Addendum F, are of particular 
importance relative to the "dangerous weapon enhancement" feature of the subsequent 
sentencing, state as follows: 
Instruction No. 41 
You are instructed that under Utah law, if in the commission or furtherance 
of an Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a dangerous weapon, he is 
subject to to (sic.) an increased penalty. 
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Instruction No. 42. 
You are instructed that if you find that the crime of Aggravated Robbery 
occurred, you must further find whether or not the defendant is subject to an 
enhanced penalty. In order to find that the defendant is subject to an 
enhanced penalty under Utah Law, you must find from all of the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that: 
L A dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the Aggravated Robbery. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence iti this case, you are 
convinced of the truth of this element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah 
Law. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the foregoing element, then you must find that the defendant is not 
subject to an enhanced penalty. 
For the reasons set forth in Point IB, supra, which are incorporated herein, even 
assuming arguendo that evidence existed in support of submitting an enhancement 
instruction to the jury, a position which the defendant does hot concede, there was error in 
failing to instruct the jury as to the proper elements of the dangerous weapon 
enhancement statute: ^f76-3-203.8, Increase of Sentence if Dangerous Weapon Used, 
Utah Code Ann. (2003). 
^[76-3-203.8, Increase of Sentence if Dangerous Weapon Used, Utah Code Ann. 
(2003), states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
76-3-203.8. Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used. 
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition 
as in Section 76-1-601. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous 
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weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court: 
(a)(i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the sentence 
applicable by law; and 
(ii) if the minimum term applicable by law is zero, shall set the minimum 
term as one year; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law in 
the case of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to 
the increases in punishment provided in Subsection (2) if the trier of fact 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony; and 
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. 
(Emphasis added) 
Under this statute, which has been found to be constitutionally sound, State v. 
AlfatlawU 2006 UT App 511, 153 P.3d 804, cert, denied, No. 20070144, 168 P.3d 819 
(Utah June 12, 2007), the trier of fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. This knowledge requirement 
was not included in Instructions 41 or 42 in any meaningful way. Nor can such a 
requirement be interpolated into instructions 41-42 by reading the full set of instructions 
as a whole. The failure was clear error. 
C. THE ERROR WAS OBVIOUS. 
The error is readily apparent and should have been obvious to the trial court. It 
is settled that "(T)he court has a duty to instruct the jury on the relevant law, and the court 
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may, even over the defendant's objection, "give any instruction that is in proper form, 
states the law correctly, and does not prejudice the defendant." State v. Low, 2008 Ut 58, 
1J27, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986). Taken as a whole, it cannot be said, as it must, that 
the jury instructions given on the enhancement issue, 41 and 42, "fairly instructed the jury 
on the applicable law." See State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ^ 18,132 P.3d 703 
(citations omitted). 
Failure of the trial court to properly instruct as to the critical element of the 
enhancement statute, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's knowledge that 
the dangerous weapon was present, was obvious error whicl)i merely compounded the 
error as to failure of proof identified in Points I and II. The court failed to adopt the 
essential language of Tf76-3-203.8, U.C.A., in any meaningful manner. Failing to include 
all the elements of a criminal statute in a jury instruction is plain, clear, and obvious error. 
In point of fact, as there was insufficient evidence to even siibmit the issue to the jury, as 
elaborated in Point I, supra, no instruction of any kind should have been given on the 
subject, as the statute does not apply. 
D. THE ERROR WAS HARMFUL. 
An error is considered harmless when it is ""sufficiently inconsequential that we 
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affepted the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v. Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). Far from being 
inconsequential, there is an evident reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
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outcome of sentencing by increasing the minimum penalty to which Mr. Jimenez was 
sentenced by one year, from five years to life to six years to life. (R. 131-132) 
As the erroneous jury instruction allowed the jury to find that a dangerous 
weapon was used, without requiring a finding that the defendant was aware of its 
presence beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict in that regard is unfounded and the 
sentence is illegal. 
An illegal sentence is reviewed for correctness. State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 
32, TJ10, 177 P.3d 637, citing State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT APP 9, | 9 , 84 P.3d 854. 
Because the sentence is not supported by an instruction requiring each element of the 
offense to be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the resulting sentence is 
illegal. An illegal sentence may be corrected pursuant to the provisions of Rule 22(e) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Reversal of the dangerous weapon enhancement 
verdict, and the sentence based thereon, is therefore required in order to prevent a 
manifest injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Jesus Jimenez respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the convictions of homicide, murder, and aggravated robbery and remand 
the case for a new trial. j ^ 
SUBMITTED this / / day of /WU/%X 2009. 
( ^ = ^ ^ ^ 
^ - —-"-"Mtorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT |LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF tJTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JESUS A JIMENEZ, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: D71906002 FS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date: September 18, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Reporter: HARMON, KATIE 
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY A 
Interpreter: Sonia Couillard (Spanish) 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Language: Spanish 
Date of birth: February 17, 1985 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 06/25/2008 Guilty 
2. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 06/25/2008 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
of not less than six years and which may be ij 
Prison. 
an indeterminate term 
ife in the Utah State 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
Page 1 
Case No: 071906002 
Date: Sep 18, 2008 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COURT ORDERS BOTH COUNTS RUN CONSECUTIVE. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
JESUS JEMENEZ 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
Board of Pardons to supervise any Restitution. 
Defendant transported from ADC for sentencing. 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
VL h c l ,"'S TR'CT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN2 5 
In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Skatejoflt^g °QUT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JESUS A. JIMENEZ, 
Defendant, 
JUHY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 071906002 
Hpn. Deno G. Himonas 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1: It's now my duty, as judge, to ilnstruct you as to the law that 
applies to this case. And it's your duty, as jurors, to follow that lawf. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2: You may take the following iten}s only into the jury room: the 
jury instructions, the exhibits admitted in evidence, your notes, and the verdict form. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3: The first thing to do in the jury rt>om is choose a "Foreperson". 
The Foreperson's duties are to keep order, allow everyone a chance to speak, and represent the jury 
in any communications that you make. The Foreperson has no more power than any other juror in 
deciding what the verdict should be. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: It's rarely good for a juror, on entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When 
that's done, a person's pride may block appropriate consideration 0f the case. But don't make a 
decision just to agree with everyone else either: your verdict must be your own. Help each other 
arrive at the truth. Use your common memory, common understanding, and common sense. Talk 
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. And respect and consider the opinions 
of your fellow jurors. If you're persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, then don't 
hesitate to change your mind. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other 
than honest deliberation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5: If you think that you need more information or a clarification, 
write a note and give it to the bailiff. I'll review it with the lawyerg and answer your question, if 
appropriate; however, these instructions, should contain all the information that you need in order 
to reach a verdict based upon the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6: Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You shouldn't 
use this case to correct perceived wrongs in other cases or to express individual or collective views 
about anything other than the guilt or imiocence of the defendant. Put a little differently, your verdict 
should reflect the facts, as found by you, applied to the law explained in these instructions and 
shouldn't be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7: This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous on 
each element of the offense. If you all come to an agreement, then you've reached a verdict. At that 
time, the Foreperson should date and sign the verdict form that reflects your decision. The 
Foreperson should then notify the bailiff that you're ready to return to court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8: After you've given me the verdict form, the clerk may ask each 
of you about it to make sure that you agree with it. I'll then excuse you. Afterward, you may talk 
about the case v/ith anyone. Likewise, you're not required to talk about it. If anyone insists on 
talking to you about the case when you don't want to, please tell the court clerk. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9: You're instructed that the defendant, Jesus Jimenez, is charged 
in the Information with murder and aggravated robbery. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10: You're not to consider Instruction No. 9 as a statement of facts; 
rather, you're to regard it as a summary of the allegations in the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11: The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not 
guilty denies each of the essential allegations of the count contained in the Information and casts 
upon the prosecution the burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12: You're instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been 
arrested, charged with this offense, and held to answer to the charge, isn't any evidence of guilt or 
even a circumstance that you should consider in determining guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13: In arriving at a verdict, you shouldn't discuss or consider the 
subject of penalty or punishment. That's a matter for the Court and other governmental agencies and 
mustn't in any way affect your decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14: All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor 
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This presumption is not a mere formality, but is a substantial part of the law intended, as far as is 
possible, to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in your minds until you're satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. And, in the case of a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal 
Also, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
burden never shifts to the defendant for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case 
the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with 
absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law doesn't require proof that overcomes every possible 
doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you're firmly convinced that the defendant 
is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the Other hand, you think there's a 
real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16: During the trial, the lawyers a^ked me to determine whether 
certain evidence might be admitted. You're not to be concerned with the reasons for such requests 
or rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether evidence is admissible is purely 
a question of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, I don't determine what 
weight should be given such evidence, nor do I pass on the credibility of the witness. You're not to 
consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by me. As to any question 
to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to wtiat the answer might have been 
or as to the reason for the objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17: As I've previously explained, yoy're to try the issues of fact that 
are presented by the allegations in the Information. You should perform this duty uninfluenced by 
pity for or passion or prejudice against the defendant. The law fjorbids you to be governed by 
sentiment, sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling. Both the prosecution and the defendant 
have a right to expect that you'll conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the 
evidence and apply the law of the case, to reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18: The evidence that you're to consider includes the testimony of 
witnesses, exhibits received into evidence, stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as stated in these instructions, and all of 
the facts and circumstances disclosed thereby. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19: You should reconcile conflicts in the evidence as far as you 
reasonably can. But where the conflicts cannot be reconciled, you're the final judges and must 
determine from the evidence what the facts are. You should carefully and conscientiously consider 
and compare all of the testimony and all of the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on any 
issue and determine therefrom what the facts are. You're not bound to believe witnesses unless their 
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts afrd circumstances in evidence. 
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against ^ fewer number, in accordance 
with your honest convictions. If you believe a witness has willfully testified falsely as to any 
material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such a witness, or you 
may give it such weight as you think it's entitled to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20: You're the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the 
witnesses, you've a right to take into consideration their bias, interest in the result of the suit, or any 
probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown. Y0u may consider the witnesses' 
deportment on the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or 
candor, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and thdr capacity to remember. You 
should consider these matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances that you may 
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21: The defendant isn't required to testify. The law expressly gives 
the defendant the privilege of not testifying if he so chooses. And if the defendant hasn't taken the 
witness stand, then you must not take that fact as any indication of guilt, nor should you indulge in 
any presumption or inference adverse to the defendant by reason thereof. The burden remains with 
the prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant testifies or not, to prove the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22: In determining any fact in this case, you shouldn't consider or 
be influenced by anything I've said or done that you may interpret as indicating my views thereon. 
You're the sole and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine 
the facts for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe I think. I haven't 
intended to express any opinion on what the proof shows or doesn't show, or what are or what aren't 
the facts in the case. You must follow your own views and not be influenced by my views. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23: If in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea has been stated 
in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, 
you're not to single out any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others; rather, you're to 
consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. Also, the 
order in which I've given the instructions has no significance as to their relative importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24: I've tried to give you instructions embodying all of the rules of 
law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of some 
of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions that you reach as to what the facts are. As 
to any such instruction, the fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion by 
me that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to 
a state of facts that you find doesn't exist, disregard the instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25: Courts of justice recognize and admit two classes of evidence, 
upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether favorable to the 
prosecution or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence, 
whether of one kind or the other or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required 
by law. One class of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes 
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to their 
effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may carry and 
accepts each as a reasonable method of proof. Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any of his/her own physical senses, 
perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was 
perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, 
insofar as it shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove 
by reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in 
arriving at a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26: I've permitted you to take notes. Many courts don't, and a word 
of caution is in order. There's always a tendency to attach undue importance to matters that one has 
written down, but some testimony that's considered unimportant at the time presented, and thus not 
written down, takes on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the evidence presented. 
Consequently, your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory and you shouldn't 
compare your notes with other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or in evaluating 
the importance of any evidence. Your notes are not evidence and are by no means a complete outline 
of the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all^  your memory should be your 
greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27: You shouldn't consider as evidence any statement of counsel 
made during the trial unless such statement was made as a stipulatiqn conceding the existence of a 
fact or facts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28: To constitute the crime charged in the Information, there must 
be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and the appropriate 
culpable mental state or states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. Before a defendant may 
be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the Information and that the defendant 
committed such conduct with the culpable mental state required for such offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29: The intent with which an act is dc^ ne denotes a state of mind and 
connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by 
direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements, and 
circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30: A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent, or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. A person engages in 
conduct knowingly or with knowledge with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. 
A person acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a result olf his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31: Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which an act is 
done or omitted. Motive is not an element of any offense, and helice need not be proven. The 
motive of an accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your 
determination of state of mind or intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 32: "On or about" includes any day ihat closely approximates or is 
near the day alleged in the Information. "Conduct" means an act or omission. "Act" means a 
voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. "Omission" means a failure to act when there is 
a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense 
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO 3^/ 
In this action the only 
defendant on trial is Jesus A. Jimenez. You are not to concern yourselves with the status of the 
case against the other defendant named in this trial. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez, of the offense of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder, as charged in Count I of the information, you must find from all of 
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense : 
1. On or about August 15, 2007; 
2. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. That the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez; 
4. As a party to the offense; 
5. While in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or attempted commission of a robbery; 
6. Caused the death of Faviola Hernandez. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth of 
each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder, as charged in the information. If, on the other 
hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
l 
INSTRUCTION NO. >^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez, of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery, as charged in Count II of the information, you must find ftom all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. On or about August 15, 2007; 
2. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. That the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez; 
4. As a party to the offense; 
5. Took, or, attempted to take, personal property from the person or immediate presence 
of Faviola Hernandez; and 
6. That such taking was unlawful; and 
7. That such taking was intentional; and 
8. That such taking was against the will of Faviola Hernandez; and 
9. That such taking was accomplished by means offeree or fear; and 
10. That in the course of committing such taking, a dangerous weapon was used; and/or 
11 Caused the serious bodily injury to Faviola Hernandez. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this c^se, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robber, as charged in the information. If, on the other 
hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one Or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 7 " 
Under Utah law. Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or attempted taking of 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against 
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. A person commits Aggravated Robbery if in 
the course of committing Robbery, that person uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon; or 
causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3$f 
You are instructed that a firearm is a dangerous weapon 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ? 
"Unlawful" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized by law, or, without legal 
justification, or, illegal. 
"Personal property" mean anything of value, and includes money. 
INSTRUCTION NO. JO 
An act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of. or in the immediate flight after 
the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
121 
INSTRUCTION NO. Hi-
You are instructed that under Utah law, if in the commission or furtherance of an 
Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a dangerous weapon, he is subject to to an 
enhanced penalty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _L^U 
You are instructed that if you find that the crime of Aggravated Robbery-
occurred, you must further find whether or not the defendant is subject to an enhanced 
penalty. In order to find that the defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty under Utah 
Law, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that: 
1. A dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Robbery. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced 
of the truth of this element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah Law. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the foregoing element, then you must find that 
the defendant is not subject to an enhanced penalty. 
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Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
Ci CHAPTER 5 OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
Q PART 2 CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
76-5 -203 . Murder. 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), yriien the victim is 
younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
{j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual afyuse of a child under 
Section 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-4)05; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8|-309; or 
(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding 
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discharge of a firearm or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of 
another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, the actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave 
risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed 
in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the 
predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the 
commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under 
Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense 
is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is 
established under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which 
may be for life. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted 
murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause 
the death of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is 
a reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not 
legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in 
Section 76-2-305; or 
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(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own 
conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse und^r 
Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actpr under Subsection (4)(a)(i 
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the 
then existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as fallows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes 
a separate offense does not merge with the crime of murder. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense 
described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense, may also 
be convicted of, and punished for, the separate offense. 
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Utah Statutes 
d Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
Q CHAPTER 6 OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
Q PART 3 ROBBERY 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if m the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in 
the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to 
commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
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Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
Q CHAPTER 6 OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
Cl PART 3 ROBBERY 
76-6 -301 . Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from |iis person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of fofce or fear, and with a 
purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently Or temporarily of the 
personal property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses forte or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of committing a iheft or wrongful 
appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or 
wrongful appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful 
appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appror. "ation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
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Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
Cl CHAPTER 3 PUNISHMENTS 
Q PART 2 SENTENCING 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute 
provides otherwise, for a term of not less than five years and which may 
be for life. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute 
provides otherwise, for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 
years. 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute 
provides otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years. 
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Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
Q CHAPTER 3 PUNISHMENTS 
E3 PART 2 SENTENCING 
dangerous weapon used. 
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition 
as in Section 76-1-601. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court: 
(a) (i) shall increase by oi le year the minimum term of the sentence 
applicable by law; and 
(ii) if the minimum te r m a p p J i c a b J e b } J a i J" :i s z e r o, s h a I ] s e 1: 1: h e m :i i I i rn urn. 
term as one year; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence appl i cab J e by J aw :i r i 
the case of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to 
the increases in punishment provided in Subsection (2) if the trier of fact 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony; and 
(1: •) 1:1 Ie d e f e n d a n t ki Iew 11: Iat 11 Ie dangerous weapon was present. 
(4) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person 
has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a 
dangerous weapon was used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony 
and that person is subsequently convicted of another felony in which a 
dangerous weapon was used in the commission of or furtherance of the 
felony, the court shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed 
including those in Subsection (2), impose an indeterminate prison term to 
be not less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
•-"•''? i-oislaw.com, ved 
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Utah Statutes 
Gl Utah Statutes 
Cl TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
Q CHAPTER 2 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Q PART 2 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for 
conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
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Utah Statutes 
Cl Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
Cl CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
CJ PART 6 DEFINITIONS 
/>« I! hl l ! D e t i i n t in ni«.» 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and. includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility i s :i i I i s s i .< ; • i i I i 
criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a ) ai I y i tem capabJ e of causii ig dea 1:h or serioi is bodi 1 y injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim 
to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim veibally or in any other manner 
that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Grievous sexual offense" means: 
(a) rape, Section 76-5-402; 
(b) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402,1; 
(c) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2; 
i • . •• Id, Section 76-5-402.3; 
(e) forcible sodomy, Subsection 76-5-403(2); 
(f) sodomy < w i :hild, Section 76-5-403.1; 
(' ; • 3 - i v • • . - ' a b I i s e <:> f a c 1 I i ] d, S u b s e c t i o i I 7 6 - 5 4 0 4 1 ( "I) ; 
(h) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405; 
(i) any felony attempt to commit an offense described in 
Subsections (6)(a) through (h); or 
(j) an offense in another state, territory, or district of the United 
States that, if committed in Utah, would constitute an offense described in 
http:// \vwwM 3/16/2009 
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Subsections (6)(a) through (i). 
(7) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(8) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, 
government, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily member or organ. 
(13) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being 
preserved. 
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Page 1 of2 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Q Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Ri :i 3 € • 111 9 I in. s t:i: i i c t i ons . 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court 
may instruct the jury concerning the jurors1 duties and conduct, the 
order of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the alleged 
crime, and the definitiqn of terms. The court may instruct the jury 
concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by 
the court and any matter the court in its discretion believes will assist 
the jurors in comprehending the case. Preliminary instructions shall be in 
writing and a copy provided to each juror. At the final pretrial 
conference or at some other time as the court directs, a party may file 
a written request that the court instruct the jury on the as set forth 
in the request. The court shall inform the parties of its action upon a 
requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall furnish 
the parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
waive this requirement. 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on 
the law if the instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the 
case. Prior to giving the written instruction, the court shall advise the 
parties of its intent to do so and of the content of the instructions. A 
party may request an interim written instruction. 
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court 
instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same 
time copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The 
court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the request; and 
it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless 
the parties waive this requirement. Final instructions shall be in 
writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The court shall 
provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its discretion, 
provide a copy to all jurors 
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the 
court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be 
given and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the 
endorsement what part of the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions 
may be made after they are given to the jury, but before the jury retires 
to consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to make 
objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an 
instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may 
not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest unjustice. In stating 
the objection the party shall identify the matter to which the objection 
is made and the ground of the objection. 
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence i n the case, and 
if the court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the 
jury that they are the exc1usive judges of a 1 1 questions of fact. 
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(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court 
has given the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
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Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Q Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rale .2, Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no 
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be 
not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless 
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. 
Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or 
alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should 
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of 
sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest 
may be issued by the court. 
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court 
shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which 
shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. 
Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of 
defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be 
filed. 
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise 
the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the conviction, 
it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any 
firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the plea 
invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea, 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the 
defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the 
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on 
the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an i.1 legaJ sentei ice, : r a sei i tie rice imposed in 
an illegal manner, at any time. 
(fj upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the coui i. ^iiaiv 
impose sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If 
the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed • o 
the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-16a-202(l) (b) , the coin t shall so specify in the 
sentencing order 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996; .Amended 
January 14, 2008, Effective January 1, 2008.) 
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ADDENDUM "E" 
You are instructed that under Utah law. it in the commission or furtherance of an 
Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a dangerous weapon, he is si ib ject t : t : • a i 
ei lhanced pei laity. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Ljl^ 
You are instructed that if you find that the crime of Aggravated Robbery 
occurred, \ou must further find whether or not the defendant is subject to an enhanced 
penalty. In order to find that the defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty under Utah 
Law. you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that: 
1. A dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Robbery. 
If. after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced 
of the truth of this element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah Law. If. on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the foregoing element, then you must find that 
the defendant is not subject to an enhanced penalty. 
ADDENDUM "F" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs.
 k 
Jesus A. Jimenez, 
Defendant. ] 
VERDICT 
Case No. 071906002 
1. We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Jesus A. 
Jimenez, (guiltyynot guilty (circle one) of Criminal Homicide, Murder, 
a First Degree Felony, as charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
DATED thisP^£> ~«day of Q T & U & , 2008. 
By. igftr 
deputy"; 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs< 
Jesus A. Jimenez, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 071906002 
1. We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Jesus A. 
Jimenez, (guilts/not guilty -{circle one) of Aggravated Robbery, a 
First Degree Felony, as charged in Count 2 of the Information. (If 
the answer to the foregoing question is "guilty", then proceed to 2.) 
2. We, the jurors in the above case,ffind^do not find (circle one) 
that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, charged in Count 2 of 
the Information. 
DATED this 2S* day of 
